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Keynote Address
The First Amendment:
The Supreme Court and the LeftWith Friends Like These
by
STEPHEN REINHARDT*

Thank you very much. It is good to see you all on a Saturday morning. Today a lot of learned professors will attempt to bring order out of
chaos, explain what the Court's general methodology is, and discuss its
attitude toward free speech. Surely this is a worthwhile intellectual exercise, will result in a notable issue of the HastingsLaw Journal,and will
stimulate lively debate among academics. I intend only to offer a few
informal thoughts as a preliminary matter-to throw out some unformulated ideas for discussion, to try out a couple of tentative themes in order
to see if they have any merit. None of my suggestions represents my final
thinking and none will necessarily be reflected in any opinions I ultimately write. When I am required to decide an issue, I am bound by
whatever the Supreme Court has said, regardless of my personal views of
the law.
To start, I am not certain how one determines what the philosophy
of a constantly changing nine-judge court is, except in the very broadest
and most general terms. And certainly I cannot tell how one determines
the Court's collective judicial methodology in an area like speech or the
First Amendment-where its members' views are so highly fragmented.
I will say, however, that the suggestion that the Court is "good" on the
First Amendment is highly overblown, like the "Greenhouse effect" 1
which probably gave rise to that misconception in the first place. Now
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judge Reinhardt delivered this address on February 20, 1993, at Hastings College of the Law. Because he
delivered his address without a manuscript, Judge Reinhardt has edited the transcript of his
remarks for publication, and has added some additional thoughts for purposes of clarification.
1. For a description of the "Greenhouse effect," see infra notes 5-6 and accompanying
text.
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let's drop back from the First Amendment for a moment, and talk about
the Court as an institution.
The Court is, of course, one of three branches of government-a
branch that has played a major role in American life and history. It has
resolved some of the toughest questions that have confronted this country, questions that other branches of government were reluctant to deal
with short of civil war-questions that range from slavery and segregation to abortion. Sooner or later the question of homosexuality, better
known today as gay or lesbian rights, will be resolved in a similar manner, notwithstanding President Clinton's awkward, although worthy, efforts to get that subject off the ground. Ultimately, as the Secretary of
Defense is trying to persuade the military, the issue of gay rights, like all
fundamental issues, will be resolved in the courts. Whether that's good
or bad is another question.
Judges and Justices are appointed, at least in recent years, to reflect
the general philosophy of the President who appoints them. It doesn't
always work as intended. But the objective is clear these days. Still,
Presidents make mistakes. Even their chiefs of staff make mistakes.
Governor Sununu thought that the administration "hit a home run"
ideologically when it appointed Justice Souter. It probably didn't. Probably, at best President Bush got a double. In fact, he may not have even
done that well; maybe he just got an ideological base on balls. But certainly the administration's objective was to appoint one of its own to the
Court, and that's a legitimate goal. Presidents wish to appoint a judiciary that generally reflects their philosophical views of government, the
Constitution, separation of powers, the executive branch, and whatever
major legal-political issues there are at the moment, such as abortion.
Those are legitimate considerations for the President to take into account
in making his judicial appointments.
And the Senate has its legitimate role, which it hasn't fulfilled very
well recently, of advising and consenting. The Senate should tell the
President, particularly if its political philosophy is different from his, "If
those appointments don't meet our needs as well, we're not going to confirm the nominees." I think the Senate has largely abdicated that responsibility in recent years. But now the issue is somewhat academic. It is
more of a concern when Congress and the executive branch are in opposite hands.
In any event, appellate judges, and Supreme Court Justices in particular, are appointed in large measure on the basis of their philosophies.
One should start with the premise that the President should only appoint
somebody who is highly qualified, and there are lots of people who meet
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that standard-lots of highly qualified reactionaries, lots of highly qualified radicals, lots of highly qualified federalists, lots of highly qualified
crits. You can go from one extreme of judicial thought to the other and
find highly qualified people. That's not the problem. Supreme Court
nominees should be, and usually are, highly qualified. Justice Scalia, for
example, is highly qualified. His views may be seen as disastrous in many
ways, depending on one's own philosophy, but he is highly qualifiedbeyond question. His was clearly a legitimate and proper nomination.
Occasionally there is a member of the Court who doesn't meet that standard, but that's the way it goes. Nothing's perfect-and certainly not the
Supreme Court.
Presidents generally try to appoint Justices of quality. They almost
always believe, and usually with good reason, that their nominees are
well qualified. They first identify a number of well-qualified candidates
who appear to share their own ideology. They then select from among
those persons a Justice who, they believe, comes closest to meeting all the
criteria they have established-or at least the most important ones for
the particular vacancy or under the particular circumstances involved.
The criteria range from overall philosophy to race or gender, to political
view and political sponsorship, to status in the legal community, to practical experience and pure intellectual ability. In the end, what Presidents
are frequently most interested in is the results a prospective Justice is
likely to arrive at on major issues, and what they are almost always least
interested in is the legal methodology an appointee is likely to apply in
arriving at his or her decisions. Only professors are really concerned
about the latter question-and maybe a few law students.
Given the manner in which Presidents select Supreme Court Justices, it should be no surprise that there is no single view of the First
Amendment on the Court. Nor should it be a surprise that even those
Justices who share a common overall political philosophy do not all have
the same ideas regarding that provision. Rather, what we find is a group
of people with somewhat differing views and attitudes regarding a complex series of questions. We also find a group of people who sometimes
want to arrive at a particular result, some of whom do it one way, some
another.
In some respects, it doesn't really matter a lot how the Justices arrive at their desired result, except to those of us who are interested in the
intellectual exercise. Certainly, -the Justices' doctrinal views are not of
general concern. Still, we like to try to rationalize them, and to find some
harmonious theories that explain a Justice's decisions and allow us to
predict where he or she is going and why. Then, adding all these analy-
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ses of individual Justices together, we can talk with great wisdom about
the views and future actions of "the Court." Sometimes, I think that if
we forgot all of the doctrinal probings and just examined the broad general philosophies and attitudes of the members of the Court, we could do
a much better job of predicting how cases are going to come out-not
that our ability to predict matters is of any great consequence anyway, at
least with respect to the most politically controversial cases.
So now let's look at the current Court in general, where it's going,
and then say what we can about it in terms of the First Amendment. I
must say, preliminarily, that a year or so, or even six months ago, when
discussing the Court and where it was going, it was a different ballgame
than it is today. We had a Court that was moving, marching steadily, in
one direction-off the edge of the cliff. And it seemed that for the foreseeable future, we were going to have a Court dedicated to a particular
rigid philosophy, a view of life exemplified by the Reagan-Bush era-a
Court that reflected in many fundamental ways, with legitimacy, the philosophy of the Presidents that had appointed its members.
The last nine or ten Justices were appointed by Republican administrations. Although not all of those appointees were named by Presidents
dedicated to perpetuating a right-wing philosophy on the Court, the vast
majority were. And it seemed that if President Bush were reelected, as
appeared to be a certainty, what was not absolutely nailed down already
would be by the end of the following four years. To the surprise of many
of us, thanks to President Bush's concentration on foreign affairs, and in
part to the perception, perhaps false, that he was ignoring the economy
(not that it was ever clear that anybody could do anything about the
economy), we suddenly discovered ourselves with a new President who
may well appoint a different kind of Justice--or so most of us believe.
And, I should say right here, that any assumptions about what a new
President will do about judicial appointments is guesswork at best. Not
all appointees reflect the philosophy of the President and, as I have indicated, there are numerous factors other than philosophy that Presidents
take into account in making appointments. That is even more true, incidentally, with respect to circuit court judges than in the case of Supreme
Court Justices.
While I do not expect that we will see another Rehnquist, Scalia, or
Thomas nominated in the next four years, I do not think that we can
assume that President Clinton is going to appoint any particular kind of
person. Like Jimmy Carter, he may be more concerned about diversity
than about philosophy, although in Carter's case we never had a chance
to see what type of Supreme Court appointments he would make. Presi-
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dent Clinton is reported to have said that he has a litmus test: One, an
appointee must be pro-choice; and two, an appointee can't be anti-death
penalty, whatever that means. We can hope that the report, if it is accurate, essentially reflects mere campaign rhetoric. There may be a legitimate reason for the first criterion in the case of nominees to the Supreme
Court, given the five-to-four vote in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey.2 However, there is clearly none for the second, since there is no danger that the
Court will hold the death penalty unconstitutional at any time in the
foreseeable future-or that any one, two, or three Justices could make
the difference on that issue.
Unfortunately, Presidents are concerned about the political effects
and ramifications of their judicial appointments, as well as about the
qualification of the candidates. Accordingly, they are concerned about
how their nominees will be perceived by the public. While from a practical standpoint this concern is rarely warranted, and in the case of circuit
and district judges is wholly unjustified, this is just part of the price we
pay for democratic elections and for the fact that Presidents, unlike federal judges, do not have lifetime tenure. And that leads us to another
matter-the attitude of the new administration toward criminal law,
habeas corpus and related subjects. But that is for another day. So too is
the question whether judges and scholars are discouraged from taking
bold and original positions by the reluctance of some Presidents to name
"controversial" persons to high office. One would hope that President
Clinton does not fall victim to that ailment, at least insofar as the naming
of judges and Justices, as well as high Justice Department officials, is
concerned. But the signs thus far are mixed at best. We'll know more
reasonably soon. Keep tuned. Now back to today's subject-the First
Amendment.
The Court as of now-and we might as well look at it as if it's frozen in time because, as I have noted, it's difficult to predict what's going
to happen in the future3-isn't a solid nine-person bloc dedicated to any
particular objectives or goals. What it is instead is basically an extremely
conservative Court with two able moderate Justices, Justices Blackmun
and Stevens (who are themselves conservative on certain issues), and
seven strong conservatives, though with somewhat differing views. Three
of the conservative Justices sometimes swing, on an individual basis, on
particular issues, and join the two moderates. On the rare occasions
when all three of the conservative swingers swing at the same time, a five2. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
3. For subsequent developments, see my supplemental comments at the end of the text,
infra p. 827.
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vote majority is formed that outvotes the conservative critical mass.
What's most startling, however, is that while the two moderate Justices
often strongly disagree with the actions of the majority, there is not a
single liberal Justice sitting today-no William Brennan, no Thurgood
Marshall, no Arthur Goldberg, no Earl Warren, no William Douglas, no
Hugo Black. Thus, the Court is badly out of balance and totally lacks an
essential ingredient-a liberal point of view. In any event, the four-person core conservative bloc, as I'm sure you all know, consists of Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice White, the
last being a John F. Kennedy appointee who, on most issues, reflects less
and less the philosophy one might expect from an appointee of that
young and idealistic President. 4 The critical fact is that on any case this
four-man bloc needs only one additional vote to prevail-and almost always, these days, it gets at least that one vote, and usually more.
There are a number of tenets that a majority of the members of today's Court seem to share. The Court is majoritarian. It is pro-government in most areas. It strongly favors the executive branch over
Congress. It has tried to increase the power of agencies and the President, and in the process has disregarded Congress's wishes with some
regularity. Whether that will continue now that there is a Democratic
President instead of a Republican one, I am not sure. We'll have to see
how the Justices feel about administrative agencies in the future. But,
back to the basic point: This is a Court that is majoritarian, statist, and
pro-executive branch; it is also one that favors the states over the federal
government, under most circumstances. The Court is not sympathetic to
individual rights in general, and is, in particular, strongly opposed to
affirmative action. That, at least to one observer, appears to be the
Court's basic philosophy in a nutshell.
Next, I think we ought to talk a bit about why the "Greenhouse
effect" gained such quick popularity. I refer of course to the theory that
because there were two good decisions in one year, somehow the Court is
not what we had thought it was. The two decisions that enabled Linda
Greenhouse of the New York Times to persuade most of the nation that
the Court had changed its stripes, that we are left with only four conservatives instead of seven, and that there is now a three-person moderate
group that controls the Court's decisionmaking, are of course Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the abortion case, and Lee v. Weisman, 5 the high
4. See infra p. 827. Justice White voted most often with Chief Justice Rehnquist during
the 1991 Term and least often with Justices Blackmun and Stevens. The Supreme Court, 1991
Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 379 (1992).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
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school graduation prayer case. The three born-again moderates, accord6
ing to Ms. Greenhouse, are Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
Each of the two cases can be explained on a number of grounds
unrelated to doctrine, and unrelated to any sudden love for moderation
that somehow overcame the swinging Justices' basic conservative instincts. While Justice Souter may ultimately prove to be the most centrist
of the three Justices, we can best examine the two decisions by considering the votes of Justice Kennedy. In the abortion case, based on his prior
judicial writings, everybody thought that Justice Kennedy was going to
vote the other way; that he would vote to overturn Roe v. Wade.7 He
had, as they say, a paper trail. However, in Casey, Justice Kennedy came
up against a number of concerns that caused him to pull back, at least
part way, from his earlier views. Those concerns were all honorable.
Justice Kennedy is truly an honorable man, and he was concerned about
the Court as an institution. He was also concerned about the role of
precedent. I think that Justice Kennedy is a true conservative, and that
in Casey, his basic conservatism came through, but in a way most people
did not expect.
Casey was sui generis. It was one of those cases that comes along
every fifty or a hundred years and tests the Court. It was a case that
truly divided the nation, a case in which a Justice does not automatically
apply his own philosophical views. Momentous decisions of this nature
cause Justices to step back, agonize, consider everything, look at history,
look at the state of the nation, and decide, for example, whether they
want to throw the country into turmoil, whether they are willing to jeopardize the future of the Court by proclaiming so deeply troublesome and
divisive a result, even if it is one they personally favor. The debate in
Casey over the legitimacy of these (and similar) concerns was bitter and
intriguing. Nevertheless, they clearly influenced the decisions of Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in a significant way.
Still, in the view of many, Casey is essentially a conservative decision. Its result was at least as much a defeat as a victory for the prochoice forces. With the votes of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the Court cut back on Roe v. Wade fairly drastically, and imposed
additional burdens on women seeking to avail themselves of the right to
have an abortion. And when the Court failed to overrule Roe, it gave as
its principal reason its unwillingness to violate principles of stare decisis.
Thus, although the three swingers disappointed the true believers by not
6. See, eg., Linda Greenhouse, Slim Margin: Moderates on Court Defy Predictions,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, § 4, at 1.

7.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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taking the most extreme conservative position possible, and although
they did not, as expected, vote to overturn Roe in its entirety, it is hardly
fair to suggest that they in any way defected to the other side, or that
they gave any signs-temporary or permanent-of a drift toward closet
liberalism. Roe survived, but barely so; the doctrine of stare decisis was
the big winner; and Casey is simply not nearly as "good" a case as some
would have us believe.
Lee v. Weisman is the other case upon which the Greenhouse theory
is based. It is another five-to-four vote that has been highly overblown.
Lee, too, is sui generis, though in a different sense. It is unique but, unlike Casey, it is not of great importance. In the Establishment Clause
area, the fundamental question is the survival of the Lemon test-the
three-part standard the Court uses in determining whether governmental
action constitutes unlawful assistance to religion. 8 Justice Kennedy had
made his views reasonably clear prior to Lee: He is no great fan of
Lemon. However, in Lee, Justice Kennedy did not find it necessary to
discuss the Lemon test. Thus, Lee notwithstanding, Lemon remains just
where it was before-in great jeopardy. While those who would keep
religion wholly separate from government unexpectedly staved off disaster in Lee, the victory may be only temporary; for the case tells us little if
anything about the future of the Establishment Clause.
Justice Kennedy's reasons for voting as he did in Lee are very
clearly expressed in his majority opinion. He believes that high school
graduation is a critical part of American life and that, from a practical
standpoint, everyone has to go to his or her own high school graduation.
One is almost compelled to do so by God or nature, or so it seemed to
bemused readers of the Court's opinion. A youth is not really a good
American, probably doesn't eat apple pie, may not even honor his father
or mother if he fails to attend his own high school graduation. In sum,
Justice Kennedy thought that attendance was not truly voluntary, and
that, as a result, high school graduation prayers constituted governmentally coerced religion.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia exhibited extreme distress
over Justice Kennedy's views and accused him of social engineering and
all the other horrible things that a true, dedicated conservative can say
about somebody who strays from the fold. Justice Scalia made it clear
that in his view attendance at one's graduation was indeed voluntary and
that no governmental coercion of any kind was even remotely involved.
Whichever Justice is correct about the nature of high school graduations,
8.

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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what matters in the long run is that Lee offers no indication that Justice
Kennedy's disaffection with Lemon has in any way lessened. Rather, it
remains the fact that Justice Kennedy appears to disagree to a significant
degree with the Court's basic doctrinal approach to the question of separation of church and state. Justice Kennedy appears to believe that government aid to religion-as opposed to government coerced religionmay be appropriate, as long as it is available on a nondiscriminatory basis. If this view prevails, we will soon see a fundamental restructuring of
First Amendment law in the area of religious freedom.
This term we have two religion cases before the Court. 9 Watch
them carefully. I don't think the Court's views on religion are at all
fixed, safe, or settled; or that anyone can say that the Court's doctrine on
religious issues is likely to be anything but conservative in the extreme.
Although Lee constituted a modest victory for the pro-First
Amendment forces, there is, unfortunately, a far more significant recent
decision in the religious freedom area: Employment Division v. Smith.10
Smith embodies concepts that are in some respects quite the opposite of
Lee's. Smith dramatically demonstrates the Court's commitment to majoritarianism, its willingness to invoke principles of majority rule to limit
individual rights-specifically the rights of religious minorities. In
Smith, Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court, said for the first time that
laws of general applicability control, even if they adversely affect a minority's religious practices. Scalia's opinion represents an abandonment
of the historic compelling governmental interest approach. Rejecting the
Court's frequently expressed contrary doctrinal position, Justice Scalia
suggested that the electorate can, by majority decision, take care of any
problems that arise in the area of religious freedom, and that adherents of
minority religions can and must trust their fate to the democratic process. Justice O'Connor replied that Justice Scalia's opinion reflects a majoritarianism that is antithetical to the basic safeguards we have always
employed to protect religious freedom in this country. Nobody could
have said it more clearly or more strongly. Justice O'Connor said, in
essence, that the views expressed by the Smith majority were inconsistent
with our historic commitment to religious liberty and the preservation of
minority rights. She appears to have been absolutely right. Unfortunately, the Smith opinion is the strongest indication of what is happening
in the freedom of religion area these days; it demonstrates starkly the
9. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir.), cert.granted, 113 S.
Ct. 52 (1992); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d
Cir.), cert granted, 113 S. Ct. 51 (1992).
10. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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force of the majoritarian views presently held by a substantial number of
members of the present Court.
Based on Employment Division v. Smith, and on what may happen
to Lemon later this year or the next, there is no reason to have any different view of the Court in the area of religious freedom than one does in
any other constitutional area. Nothing is settled, of course, and there
may well be changes in the Court that will affect the future course of its
decisionmaking. But right now there seem to be at least five votes that
are not particularly sympathetic to the way the Court has traditionally
viewed the freedom of religion component of the First Amendment. And
the change that Smith appears to signal could be revolutionary indeed.
It is equally difficult to understand the basis for the growing myth
that the Court is a pro-First Amendment institution when one reviews its
decisions in the free speech area. I would guess that the myth is based in
part on one or two cases of highly limited applicability that appear to
favor the media.I' It may also be based on an unwarrantedly optimistic
reading of a rather opaque and troubling case, R.A. V v. City of St.
Paul.12 More on R.A. V later. In the meantime, all the signs indicate
that there is serious trouble in the freedom of speech area as well as in the
area of freedom of religion.
One case sometimes cited to show that the Court is more enlight13
ened in speech cases than in other areas of constitutional law is Forsyth,
in which five votes were collected in support of the pro-First Amendment
position. The bad news, however, is that the four person minority, composed of Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and White, the solid conservative
bloc, fell only one vote short of prevailing in what should have been an
easy case for the pro-First Amendment forces. Many people thought
that the issue in Forsyth had been settled a long time ago, that it was
clear that the government can't charge large fees to people who want to
parade in the streets or express their views at a demonstration, but four
of the Justices thought that there was no problem at all with doing just
that. By the time the Court got to the next case, Krishna Consciousness, 14 the conservative majority had picked up Justice O'Connor's
vote-and, as we have seen, that's all that has to happen; only one vote
need join the basic four. So, by a five-four vote the Court limited the
locations that constitute public fora and banned solicitations at airports
11. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
12. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
13. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992).
14. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).

Apri 1993]

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

(although by the same numerical vote it overturned a prohibition on distributing materials at these locations)." Earlier cases like Rust v. Sullivan (the abortion gag-order rule), 16 and United States v. Kokinda (the
post office sidewalk case)' 7 had delivered nothing but bad news to First
Amendment advocates. And worst of all, in Cohen v. Cowles Media, 8
the Court adopted a Smith-like "rule of general applicability" approach
and applied minimal rationality review rather than strict scrutiny in a
damage action arising out of a newspaper's publication of material it
deemed to be newsworthy.
The secondary effect cases like Renton, 19 in which the Court held
that government can regulate speech if it is doing so because the speech
has an untoward secondary effect rather than because of any disapproval
of the content of the speech, appear to draw a line without much substance, one that is exceedingly difficult to apply. The primary-secondary
dichotomy may well be in the eye of the judiciary only. Moreover, one
could just as easily say that if the government regulates speech because of
its effect, secondary or otherwise, it is doing so because it does not like
the result the content of the speech tends to bring about. It is the content, of course, that determines the effects and, therefore, a strong argument can be made that the prohibition is in actuality content-based.
What real protection is there in a rule that says that one can say something as long as it has no harmful effect, but that if it has such an effect
then the speech can be regulated? Yet that's the doctrine that seems to
prevail these days: The state can regulate speech if it has an effect, albeit
only if the effect is a secondary one-whatever that means.
A major problem with the Renton doctrine is the risk of misapplication-a risk that involves a high price when free speech is involved.
Even assuming that one could justify, intellectually, a regulation of
speech based on secondary as opposed to primary effects, the state legislatures and city councils that implement the doctrine are often neither
sophisticated in its use nor particularly concerned abut First Amendment
niceties. All too often the regulators are willing to plunge ahead with
measures that limit speech and to leave the constitutional questions to
later decision by the courts. The practical result is that, at a minimum,
free speech is impaired for a substantial period of time. And even worse,
of course, conservative courts may, due to their philosophical impulses or
15. Id at 2709.
16. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
17. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
18. 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
19. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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inclinations, permanently uphold prohibitions that should be struck
down even under Renton. In the end, a dispute over the subtleties of a
doctrine that may appear to the readers of law reviews to be intriguing
but reasonably harmless can have highly deleterious effects on sensitive
First Amendment rights.
To digress for a moment, the debates over doctrines often are standins for substantive disagreements over matters of policy. The secondary
effects doctrine reflects a substantive disagreement about limiting, if not
eliminating, so-called adult entertainment. The same is true in other areas as well. To give another example, the plain meaning test, which is
one of Justice Scalia's favorites, often serves as a proxy for limiting congressional power. Under that test, courts don't look to see what Congress said it intended to do in a statute; what we do instead is look only at
the language it actually adopted. We look at the "plain meaning."
That's a wonderful doctrine, except for the way it works in practical
application.
For an example of plain meaning in action, take Cipollone,20 a case
decided last term. Cipollone involves the question whether the federal
cigarette package labelling statute results in the preemption of state laws
that permit the award of damages to people who die from smoking cigarettes. The issue was whether when the federal government says "We're
going to require manufacturers to label the cigarette packages," that
meant that the states were told, "and you cannot regulate this subject
matter in any way." There were two provisions of the federal law involved, and when it came time to determine their effect all the Justices
said "Let's apply the plain meaning." But lo and behold, two Justices
said "plain meaning" means "the states can't regulate"; three said "plain
meaning" means "the states can regulate"; and four said "it's half and
half, depending on which regulation you look at."
What is the purpose of a doctrine that is labeled "plain meaning," if
plain meaning differs from Justice to Justice? Cipollone is hardly the
only example. There were similar cases in just the last term. 2 1 We haven't really said very much when we say we'll apply the plain meaning of
a statute if what a Justice then does is apply his or her own political
philosophy and says "Now, that's what the meaning is." Yet that's precisely what happens in a number of plain meaning cases. Please do not
misunderstand. Occasionally there is a plain meaning, and when there is,
it should ordinarily control. But on numerous other occasions, the doc20. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
21. See, e.g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 112 S. Ct. 2589 (1992) (dividing 63 on "plain meaning").
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trine simply serves as an excuse to permit the Court to ignore Congress's
wishes and to arrive instead at the result the Court desires to reach. That
is hardly a great advance in jurisprudence. What the plain meaning doctrine accomplishes all too often these days is to minimize the role of Congress while expanding the power of the Court-all in the name of
textualism and judicial restraint.
My somewhat cynical approach to the manipulation of doctrine
does not mean that I believe that we should abandon our efforts to apply
consistent rules or standards and let any judge do whatever he or she
wants with a case. Nor am I saying that most judges do or would do that
in any event. What I am saying, at least in part, is that judging does not
simply involve taking doctrines and labels and neatly applying them to
facts. It doesn't work that way. How one applies a particular doctrine
depends on what one's philosophy is, what one's view of law is, what
one's attitudes toward life are, what one's idea of government is, and
sometimes even what result justice seems to demand in the case before
you. It is some or all of those factors that determine how one applies a
doctrine in a particular case. So understanding the doctrine is only the
first step-at that point the observer has just begun to get a glimmer of
what the Court may ultimately do. In short, determining the content of
the doctrines the Supreme Court is currently applying in the First
Amendment area does no more than give us our first clue as to how the
Court will decide a particular matter it has before it.
One lesson a study of the cases teaches us is that individual Justices
do not apply doctrines consistently. They may apply a rule one way today, another way tomorrow-as may the Court as a whole. So we
should try to understand the doctrinal issues if we can. But we must go
on ahead-if we wish to try to predict the future course of the law-to
attempt to determine the basic philosophies and attitudes of the members
of the Court: why they are there, what they stand for, their relative concerns over liberty and property, their views on race and gender, what
kind of society they believe should exist in this nation of ours. With that
type of knowledge, our rate of success in predicting the outcome of
Supreme Court cases would be likely to improve dramatically.
Now, unfortunately I'm running short of time, and I have hardly
mentioned the principal case I would like to discuss. I'll try to do it
quickly. There are other cases I could mention, by the way, if anyone is
still feeling particularly optimistic about the Supreme Court's view on
the First Amendment. There is for example the nude dancing case,
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Barnes v. Glen Theatre,22 and Frisby v. Schult, 2 3 in which the Court
upheld an ordinance that prohibited all picketing before or about a residence. In fairness, I should add that, occasionally, "good" cases, such as
"Son-of-Sam" come along. 24 However, the state statute in "Son-of-Sam"
was so clearly unconstitutional that it is difficult to imagine that any
judge would have upheld it. The statute singled speech out for sanctioning exclusively, and provided for the forfeiture of assets acquired as a
result of the exercise of First Amendment rights but no others. Not surprisingly, the vote in the Supreme Court was nine to nothing.
That brings us to the principal free speech case I want to address:
R.A. V v. City of St. Paul,25 the hate speech case. What does that case
tell us about doctrine? Does doctrine drive the result or does the wishedfor result dictate the use or even the development of a particular doctrinal approach? Or both? Or is it possible for us to know in R.A. V or any
other case?
In R.A. V, Justice Scalia wrote an opinion that I could spend many
hours trying to explain. It invalidated a hate speech ordinance. A lot of
people who believe strongly in the First Amendment like the opinion; a
lot of people who believe just as strongly in that Amendment don't. I
don't particularly like it, but that is a different matter. As a circuit judge,
I will follow R.A. V as best as I can. In R.A. V, Justice Scalia creates
sub-categories of unprotected speech and then distinguishes among them;
essentially, he states that content-based discrimination within a class of
unprotected speech is contrary to the First Amendment. Previously, all
unprotected speech had generally been thought to be fair game for regulation under any circumstances. Without discussing the question in detail, I need say only that the category of unprotected speech now presents
a far more complicated problem than it did before.
Most people have difficulty in understanding the R.A. V doctrine;
few are certain where it is intended to lead us. R.A. V is far less clear
than Smith, although there may be a consistent approach underlying the
two cases. In any event, Justice Scalia is probably having a wonderful
time with his new doctrine, mystifying the rest of us, and causing all sorts
of professors to offer complex and contradictory explanations. In the
end, however, it is too early to say whether the doctrine will ultimately
have a significant impact on the law. One thing about R.A. V is clear,
22.
23.
24.
(1991).
25.

111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
487 U.S. 474 (1988).
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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however. The Court missed an opportunity to take a major step forward
in the free speech area. The Court was asked to repudiate the fighting
words doctrine and, to the dismay of most free speech supporters, refused to do So. 2 6 Instead, Justice Scalia expressly assumed the doctrine's
continued existence and based the remainder of his opinion on that assumption. The four-person minority, incidentally, also found the statute
invalid, but on overbreadth grounds. It strongly rejected Justice Scalia's
analytical approach, but it too failed to repudiate the philosophically outdated and much-criticized fighting words exception. Thus, in R.A. V, a
major doctrinal obstacle to the exercise of free speech rights was permitted to stand, apparently without even a fight on the part of either the
conservative or moderate branches of the Court.
To many observers, what matters most about R.A. V is not the resolution of, or failure to resolve, particular doctrinal issues, but rather the
question of why the case came out as it did. Some would say that, as far
as the majority is concerned, doctrine was secondary and the Justices'
decision was largely motivated by their attitudes toward laws affecting
race and gender. It seems reasonably apparent from R.A. V that the
Court doesn't like hate speech laws. (Let me make it clear that I am
referring here only to hate speech laws and not to hate crime statutes or
sentencing enhancement provisions.) The Court's dislike of hate speech
regulations could be explained solely on First Amendment grounds.
However, the majority's dislike of many of the other laws in the area of
race or gender, particularly those involving affirmative action, is evident-and it is that dislike that raises questions about why the majority
voted as it did.
The Rehnquist Court has ruled against the claims of racial minorities in the vast majority of civil rights cases it has had before it. It appears to have a particular aversion to what it perceives to be special
preference laws-laws that seem to give special treatment to minorities
or women. In fact, the Court generally upholds claims of racial discrimination only when they are asserted by or on behalf of white males.
(Some voting rights and jury challenge cases are different for reasons
that, regrettably, there is insufficient time to explain here.)27 Congress
had to override the Court five times after one particularly memorable
term. 28 The congressional reversals were incorporated in the Civil
26. The fighting words doctrine was created in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942).
27. But see Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992) (drastically limiting applicability of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).

28.

Congress overrode, in whole or in part, the holdings of Patterson v. McLean Credit
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Rights Act of 1991,29 which overruled three other decisions of the Rehnquist Court as well. 30 When President Bush ultimately signed the bill,
his action was historic. It completed a sweeping and wholly unprecedented repudiation by the executive and legislative branches of government of the Supreme Court's approach to a central area of the law-fair
and equal treatment for minorities. It is this history, more than any
other factor, that has led some to believe that philosophical opposition to
civil rights laws rather than commitment to doctrinal principles drove
the Court's majority to invalidate the R.A. V speech ordinance. That is a
judgment, however, that I must leave to others.
It is important to observe at this point that there can be little doubt
that the Court reached the right result in R.A. V and that there are very
good First Amendment reasons for courts to be skeptical of hate speech
laws-reasons that liberals ought to appreciate. Conservatives oppose
hate speech laws for a variety of reasons-some good, some bad. But I
am perplexed by the failure of many liberals to see the inherent dangers
in such regulations. I am particularly perplexed by liberals who argue
that the courts should strike down "bad" speech and uphold "good"
speech when such an argument is necessarily addressed to the policy values of "unfriendly" judges.
On a purely pragmatic basis, it would be a serious mistake for liberals to reverse their historic position and tell this Supreme Court that it
should uphold harmless speech, but it should permit the suppression of
speech that is harmful. It just doesn't seem to make much practical sense
for liberals to argue that the values of the judiciary should be determinative-certainly not at a time when most federal judges (and not just the
members of the Supreme Court) are extremely conservative in both their
political and judicial philosophies. Put simply, it seems contrary to their
own self-interest for liberals to urge this Court or this federal judiciary to
decide free speech cases, or indeed any others, on the basis of judges' own
political views or attitudes-more specifically, to decide free speech cases
on the basis of which speech the members of the Court believe to be
offensive or hurtful.
To urge the courts to distinguish between "good" and "bad" speech,
as some on the left are prone to do these days, to urge that there are
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), Lorrance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989), Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

29.

Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).

30. Congress also overrode West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991),
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), and Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478

U.S. 310 (1986).
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certain views one ought to have, that we all ought to be feminists, for
example; to argue that we should suppress the speech of those who do
not agree with us and, specifically, the speech of those who do not respect
women sufficiently, is neither very sensible nor very practical. To make
such arguments is ostensibly to tell the Court to suppress speech that is
harmful to "shared" values. But there is no agreement on what those
"shared" values are. And although some might urge that speech that
trenches on the Fourteenth Amendment is different from all other kinds
of speech, others disagree; they find their justification for suppression of
speech in concerns that are just as serious to them-that they believe
have constitutional ramifications: life or death (read, "abortion counseling"), national security (read, "publication of information embarrassing
to the government"), the welfare of minors (read, "art, literature, or
movies that offend the moral sense of the majority"). Once the door is
open to suppressing speech on the basis of "offensiveness," there is no
knowing where the suppression will stop-or what today's courts would
do.
To turn from the pragmatic to the principled, the left-wing effort to
limit speech is no more acceptable constitutionally than the earlier rightwing attempts. Urging that speech be punished is simply not the way
that people who believe in protecting and promoting constitutional values should argue-or think-under any circumstances, whether or not
the speech at issue is obnoxious or offensive, and even it if is hurtful to
people who have already suffered more than their share of indignities.
And that would be the case whether the Supreme Court is headed by
Chief Justice Warren or Chief Justice Rehnquist, whether its primary
intellectual force is Justice Brennan or Justice Scalia.
It is ironic that the greatest threat to the First Amendment these
days is the assault from the left-that it comes in the form of a campaign
to limit offensive speech because of its impact on women and minorities.
Historically, everyone who has sought to limit the First Amendment has
always had a strong and superficially persuasive reason for doing so. Almost always there is a very real moral conviction that underlies the efforts of the speech suppressors. Fundamentalists want to limit the First
Amendment because they want to protect children against immorality;
they want to maintain a vigorous and healthy society free of debilitating
or poisonous influences. National security advocates want to limit
speech because they see subversives under almost every bed-and thus a
continuing threat to the very survival of the nation.
Today, some feminists want to limit the First Amendment because
of their desire to protect women against abuse. That is, of course, a wor-
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thy reason-extremely worthy. Those who want to regulate speech that
offends racial or religious minorities have persuasive reasons also; in fact,
they may well have the best reasons of all. No one can doubt the legitimacy of these advocates' concerns over the effects of speech. Speech can
hurt deeply-and it does-and it hurts particularly those who are most
vulnerable. However, there is really little new about the debate. A generation ago, those who sought to prevent a march in Skokie, Illinois that
deeply offended Jews had valid reasons for wanting to ban the parade.
The march was scheduled through the heart of a Jewish community consisting in large part of Holocaust survivors. But those who were committed to the First Amendment, including many individual Jews and Jewish
leaders, opposed the limitation on free speech, and they prevailed.
In summary, there are two good reasons why traditional advocates
of free speech must hold the line. One, free speech is essential to our
democracy; it is at the core of our rights and of our Constitution; it is just
plain wrong to limit it. Two, if the argument and the dialogue are shifted
from the question of what is free speech to what speech should be suppressed, what speech is wrong-headed, what speech is harmful, the odds
are that traditional free speech protection will go right down the drain.
The speech that the courts might condemn as "harmful" could well be
the speech that lies at the heart of new ideas and progress, speech that
expands our cultural and artistic horizons, speech concerning subjects
with which the majority is not yet fully comfortable-in short, the very
speech that most needs and deserves the protection of the First
Amendment.
The First Amendment has often been the subject of attack by wellmotivated persons concerned about the public good. In fact, the aphorism that the greatest harm is often done by well-meaning individuals
finds its greatest applicability in the First Amendment area. Most of the
attempts to limit the First Amendment have come from people of good
will who are trying to save the country they love and the values they
believe made it great. Fortunately, since the 1920s, the era of Holmes
and Brandeis, the Supreme Court has, except in a few notable instances,
been steadfast in its opposition to efforts to suppress speech.
So, while the Supreme Court's current view of First Amendment
doctrine leaves much to be desired, the Court may soon be called on once
again to save us from ourselves. In the end I believe it will rise to the
occasion; whether because of its underlying hostile attitude toward what
it perceives as special treatment of minorities or because its members are
fundamentally committed to the Constitution and to the preservation of
the Bill of Rights. We may never be sure of the Court's reasons, regard-
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less of the doctrinal rationale set forth in its opinions. However, as I said
earlier, any attempt to isolate a single motivating force and attribute it to
the "the Court" is far too simplistic. Different Justices act for different
reasons, and most Justices are motivated by a variety or combination of
forces. So whether it is wrong-headed political views, a principled dedication to First Amendment rights, or both, the end result will probably
be that only the Court will ultimately be able to save us from the latest
assaults on free speech.
I would urge all or you who support laws or policies that might
impinge on the First Amendment to give very serious thought, not just to
the immediate results, but to the long range effects. Think long and hard
before you support anything that regulates, modifies, or prohibits speech
of any kind. I think we're all strong enough to survive speech, no matter
how distasteful or hurtful it may be. If today's Supreme Court can go
along with that, so can the rest of us. At the same time, however, we
must remember our particular obligation to afford fair and equal treatment to those who have historically been deprived of full opportunities to
participate in the benefits of our society. If we redouble our efforts to
give full meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment, some day, I hope, there
will no longer be a justification for the argument that members of historically discriminated against or subordinated groups require special protection against speech that is harmful.
Thank you.
Following my delivery of the above speech and my completion of
the editing process, Justice White announced that he will retire at the
conclusion of the present term. His action will of course change the mix
and the chemistry on the Court, and could, depending on who his successor is, result in some cases being decided differently. Those cases, however, are likely to be few in number. The fundamental nature of the
present Court will remain the same. There will still be six strong conservatives and two moderates-and the magic number remains at five.
Five is still the number of votes necessary to carry the day and, as Justice
Brennan used to tell his incoming law clerks, that is the number that
matters around here.

